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This report presents an application of economic theory to the 
case of organic food products and the certification system.  
 
Based on a synopsis of the existing literature, a theoretical 
framework of organic certification is developed with a 
classification of relevant transaction costs, which are specifically 
linked to the production and commerce of organic food products.  
 
Relevant terms regarding inspection and certification (Part A) 
and economic concepts (Part B) are compiled in the Glossary, to 
be found in the Annex of this report.  Contents 
 
Contents 
 
List of figures    ...............................................................................................................  4
List of tables    ................................................................................................................  4
Abbreviations     ...............................................................................................................  5
Introduction    ...............................................................................................................  6
1  Organic certification system    .........................................................................  7
1.1  History of organic farming and organic certification    ..........................................  7
1.2  Development of the European regulation on organic food and farming    ............  8
1.3  Organic certification in the European Union    .....................................................  9
2  Theoretical framework    .................................................................................  13
2.1  Organic food quality     ........................................................................................  13
2.2  Institutional economics    ...................................................................................  14
2.2.1  Economics of information    ...............................................................................  14
2.2.2  Transaction cost economics     ..........................................................................  16
2.3  Economics of crime    ........................................................................................  22
3  Benefits and costs of organic certification    ................................................  26
3.1  Costs of organic certification     ...........................................................................  26
3.2  Benefits of organic certification    .......................................................................  28
Annex: Glossary    ......................................................................................................  30
Glossary Part A –  Inspection and Certification    ...................................................  31
Glossary Part B – Economic terms     ........................................................................  40
References    ...............................................................................................................  47
 Lists of figures and tables 
 
4 
 
List of figures  
 
Figure 1: Simple structure of certification     ......................................................................... 8
Figure 2: Certification systems in the European Union and the CERTCOST project 
countries with the number of control bodies and/or authorities active in the 
country (Rundgren 2008; European Union 2009)    ................................................... 10
Figure 3: Institutions involved in organic certification against the European organic 
standard    ................................................................................................................. 11
 
 
 
List of tables  
 
Table 1:  Structuring market transaction costs – example A: Farmer selling tomatoes 
to consumers    .......................................................................................................... 20
Table 2:  Structuring market transaction costs – example B: Farmer selling tomatoes 
to a processor     ......................................................................................................... 21Abbreviations  
 
5 
 
Abbreviations  
 
Art.  Article  
CAC   Codex Alimentarius Commission 
CAC/GL   Codex Alimentarius Commission Guidelines 
CB  Control body  
EEC  European Economic Community  
EC   European Community 
EN   European Norm 
FAO   Food and Agricultural Organisation of the United 
Nations  
GTZ   Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammen-
arbeit (German Technical Cooperation) 
IFOAM   International Federation of Organic Agriculture 
Movements 
ISO   International Organization for Standardization 
ITF   International Task Force on Harmonisation
NOP   National Organic Program 
 and 
Equivalence in Organic Agriculture 
SCM   Standard Cost Model  
USDA   United States Department of Agriculture  Introduction  
 
6 
 
INTRODUCTION  
 
Certification is a key element in  marketing  organic food products.  Based on 
economic theory, this report wants to illustrate the economic reasoning for 
certification. The intention is to provide a description of economic concepts, which 
is understandable for a wider audience. We are focusing on the basic economic 
literature.  
Chapter 1 “Organic certification system” describes the current control system in 
the European Union. Why this is necessary, will then be explained based on a 
synopsis of economic literature. Of specific significance for organic certification 
and the CERTCOST project are the concepts of institutional economics and 
economics of crime. The relevant points of economic theory will be presented and 
discussed in chapter 2 “Theoretical framework”. Finally, the costs and benefits of 
organic certification will be illustrated in chapter 3 “Costs and benefits of organic 
certification”.  
The authors gratefully acknowledge the fruitful discussion with and the 
contributions from the CERTCOST project partners, especially those from Michal 
Lostak and Lukas Zagata from the  Czech  University of Life Sciences (CULS), 
during the elaboration of this report.  
 
 Chapter 1_Organic certification system 
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1 ORGANIC CERTIFICATION SYSTEM 
 
The organic certification
1
1.1  History of organic farming and organic certification 
 system in place in the European Union was established 
in the 1990s. The idea of organic agriculture however is much older, dating back to 
the 1920s. In this chapter the development of organic farming and the resulting 
formation of today’s certification system shall be described.  
Today, organic food and farming in the European Union is regulated by Council 
Regulation (EC) No 834/2007. One common starting point of the different organic 
movements, which evolved in the beginning of the last century, was the objective 
to develop a farming system relying on the farm-own resources as far as possible 
(“concept of the farm as an organism”) (Lampkin et al. 1999; Dabbert et al. 2004).  
Concepts on how to farm, were published in articles firstly and people discussed 
and developed these concepts in the different movements and groups. There was 
no necessity to define precise production rules as long as the consumers bought 
organic products directly on farms. With growing markets, the relationship between 
farmers and consumers became more impersonal. The need for more formalised 
systems became apparent in order to, both, protect consumers from fraud and to 
protect producers from unfair competition (Schmid 2007). 
Over the years, the different concepts of the organic movements became more 
formal and developed into guidelines  (Vogt 2001). The compliance  with such 
guidelines initially was inspected informally (Rundgren 2002), e.g. by farmers from 
the association.  
By-and-by, this system emerged into a more and more formal system of 
standards:  written rules which are controlled via onsite-inspections by an 
                                            
1 Bold terms are explained in the glossary, to be found in the Annex to this report.  
 Chapter 1_Organic certification system 
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independent body, the control body. Sanctions could be imposed on producers 
not fulfilling certain standard requirements (Rundgren 2002).  
Setting up formal rules was a necessary prerequisite for the enlarging organic food 
market. Over the years, the initial concepts thus changed into binding standards 
which became more and more detailed and comprehensive (Vogt 2001). The first 
national private standard of organic farming was established in Great Britain in 
1973 and the first national regulation  (public standard) in the European Union 
was adopted in 1983 in Austria (Lampkin et al. 1999).  
The  inspection  or control system which controls  the compliance with the 
standards developed in parallel with the standards. Specialised control bodies
2
Figure 1
 
emerged during the 1980s. Certification is the procedure by which a independent 
body, the certification body as third party next to producer and consumer, gives – 
based on a control – assurance by a certificate that a product or process is in 
conformity with certain standards (Codex Alimentarius Commission 1995; 
Rundgren 2007), see  .  
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Figure 1: Simple structure of certification 
1.2  Development of the European regulation on organic food 
and farming  
Increasing interest in organic agriculture and food by consumers during the 1980s 
faced non-transparent organic markets and high fraudulent potential (Dabbert et al. 
2004).  Council Regulation (EEC) 2092/91 on organic production of agricultural 
products and indications referring thereto on agricultural products and foodstuffs 
                                            
2 Regarding the use of the term “control body” and its differentiation from the terms certification body and 
inspection body, see also ”Control body” in the Glossary.  Chapter 1_Organic certification system 
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was adopted in 1991 in order to ensure fair competition between producers and 
products and in order to ensure transparency of organic production methods and 
hereby increase consumers’ credibility in organic food (EC 1991).
3
This regulation for the first time defined what could be sold as organic food on the 
globally important European market. It was and the subsequent Council 
Regulation (EC) No 834/2007 currently  is the minimum  European  standard, 
defining the processes by which organic food has to be produced.  
  
1.3  Organic certification in the European Union  
By regulation 2092/91 the Member States where obliged to set up a  control 
system in order to assure the organic quality. Three different control systems are 
in place in the different Member States (see Figure 2):  
A  System of approved private control bodies  
B  System of a designated public control authority(ies)  
C  System of a designated public control authority and approved private control 
bodies (European Union 2009)  
The basic structure of the different control systems in the Member States is the 
same. Any organic operator  must notify her/his  activity to the competent 
authority of the Member State where the activity is carried out (EC 2007, Art. 28, 
1(a)).
4
                                            
3 The increasing importance of environmental concerns regarding the agricultural production led to the 
implementation of national support programmes for organic farming and to its integration into the Common 
Agricultural Policy reform in 1992 (Dabbert et al. 2004).  
 All operators who produce, prepare, store and import organic foods are 
controlled for compliance with the organic standard (since January 2009 this is 
based on Council Regulation (EC) No 834/2007). In case of compliance, the 
control body or control authority issues a certificate (documentary evidence) to 
the operator. This certificate assures the adherence to the underlying organic 
standard and has the function of a quality signal.  
4 The notification of an operator’s organic production activity to the competent authority is usually done by the 
control body of an operator.  Chapter 1_Organic certification system 
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Figure 2: Certification systems in the European Union and the CERTCOST project countries 
with the number of control bodies and/or authorities active in the country (Rundgren 2008; 
European Union 2009) 
Control bodies have to demonstrate that their certification processes are in line 
with the general requirements for product certification systems as laid down in 
European Standard EN 45011  respectively  ISO Guide 65. This is done by 
accreditation, a procedure by which an authoritative body (either a public or a 
private accreditation body) gives a formal recognition that the control body is 
competent to provide inspection and certification services  (International Task 
Force (ITF) 2007).  Furthermore,  the control body must be approved by a 
designated authority (approval) and is supervised by the competent authority of a 
Member State (EC 2007, Art. 27 states specific requirements).  Chapter 1_Organic certification system 
 
 
11 
 
Control body / Control authority
National government / ministry (Member State)
Competent national authority / (federal) authorities 
Accreditation Body
Organic Operator
European organic standard
Council regulation (EC) No 834/2007 &
Commission Regulation (EC) No 889/2008
European Commission
 
Figure  3:  Institutions involved in organic certification  against  the European organic 
standard 
This organic control system is supervised on two levels: on the national level by 
the Member States and on the European level by the European Commission. The 
supervising authorities in the Member States (“competent authorities”) shall ensure 
objective and independent controls and verify the effectiveness of controls (EC 
2007, Art. 27, 9), see Figure 3.
5
Certification  against  Council Regulation (EC) No 834/2007 is compulsory. 
Furthermore, every organic operator can voluntarily decide on being certified for 
one or more private standards, e.g. standards from farmers’ associations, umbrella 
organisations or certification bodies. Since every organic food product which is 
sold in the EU,  has to comply with the European organic standard, private 
standards can  only be equivalent or stricter  than  Council Regulation (EC) No 
 The Member States report information on the 
control system and its supervision to the European Commission on a yearly basis.  
                                            
5 There can be different competent authorities responsible for the supervision of the organic control system in 
Member States with a federal structure.  Chapter 1_Organic certification system 
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834/2007.  In some countries, private standards reach  considerable market 
shares.
6
The adherence to a private standard is usually  controlled by an independent 
private control body, which checks the compliance with the standard (cf. 
 
Figure 1: 
Simple structure of certification). Additional controls result in additional costs for 
the certification against private standards. Sometimes, these additional 
certifications are criticised  as double or triple certification, leading to  additional 
costs only. But the decision for or against this certification is voluntary and relies 
on the individual cost-benefit considerations of an operator. Nonetheless,  if  a 
private standard represents a de-facto minimum quality standard (e.g. due to high 
market coverage),  the standard owner might be tempted to misuse this strong 
market position.  
 
                                            
6  Further information on private organic standards will be gathered and published on the homepage 
http://organicrules.org/ in the course of the CERTCOST project.  Chapter 2_Theoretical framework 
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2 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
Organic food exhibits specific quality attributes which require specific assurance 
instruments, i.e. certification, on these attributes.  Firstly, the characteristics of 
organic food quality will be illustrated in this chapter before the institutional 
economics concepts of information and transaction costs will be discussed. 
Finally, the concept of economics of crime, which is of relevance regarding the 
enforcement of a standard, will be introduced.  
2.1  Organic food quality  
The European Commission considers the information of consumers on the 
“product characteristics and farming attributes” as an “essential goal of agricultural 
policy”  (Commission of the European Communities 2009). This statement 
distinguishes between product characteristics or product quality on the one hand 
and the process of producing food or the process quality on the other hand. These 
two dimensions of quality are important, especially for organic food products.  
Regarding food, the product quality is mainly given by nutritional and sensory (look, 
smell, taste) attributes which can usually be tested on the product. The organic 
quality of food mainly results from the production process: the “way in which it was 
produced and the procedures involved in processing” (Schröder 2003). Therefore, 
organic quality is called a process quality. This specific quality cannot be reliably 
tested on the product itself (Caswell et al. 1998; Northen 2000) and results  in 
potential quality uncertainty for consumers.  
The information needs of organic food consumers regarding the process quality 
can be met by the implemented  control system via  labelling  (control label) 
(Commission of the European Communities 2009). The certification provides 
assurance concerning the organic quality to buyers of organic food products.  
 Chapter 2_Theoretical framework 
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2.2  Institutional economics 
Institutional economics directly entitle the fundamental matter of their analysis: 
institutions. The definition and understanding of this term however is challenging, 
because it includes many different notions. In general, institutions  have a 
regulative respectively guiding character for social interaction either of formal (e.g. 
a law, a contract or a standard) or informal kind (e.g. customs or unwritten rules of 
any group). The following examples of  institutions illustrate the multitude and 
diversity, from  the  public to the  private area: the state, economic freedom, a 
contract, the matrimony and the rules of a game (North 1990; Göbel 2002).  
We understand an institution as a system of norms comprising instruments of 
enforcement targeting to particular goals. This system intends to govern individual 
behaviour (Richter and Furubotn 2003).  
It is evident that a rule is ineffective if it is not accompanied by procedures for 
detecting deviations from the rule and an associated sanction system. Hence, a 
governance system combines formal and informal rules with instruments for 
enforcement of the  rule. The latter can either be a soft, e.g. value-rational or 
ethical mechanism or a  hard sanction defined by a law. Hereby, institutions 
structure economic operations and activities and reduce uncertainty of the actors 
(North 1990). In markets, the framework of rules  results  in easier exchange 
processes and finally reduces the costs that are connected to the trade of goods 
and services. Summarizing, institutions influence economic behaviour of 
individuals and hereby the whole economic process.  
With regard to organic food certification, the definition (by  a standard or the 
European Regulation 834/2007) of what organic food is can be considered as an 
institution.  This  institution is of twofold relevance:  first, it helps solving the 
information problem of consumers regarding the organic quality, by defining what 
exactly can be sold as organic food. This aspect will further be illustrated in 
chapter 2.2.1 ( Economics of information). Second, the organic standard as an 
institution  facilitates coordination  and competition along the supply chain and 
lowers the costs of exchanging organic goods by reducing uncertainty (Will and 
Guenther 2007). Using the concept of transaction cost economics, the cost 
relevance of standards for both, producers and consumers, will be discussed and 
analyzed in chapter 2.2.2 (Transaction cost economics).  
2.2.1   Economics of information 
In economics, the concept of Homo Oeconomicus is widely applied. This model of 
mankind  in economic theory assumes  rational behaviour based on complete 
information, i.e. perfect market transparency regarding the prices and quality of the 
goods traded and the conduct of market actors.  
Models as simplifications of the real world normally exhibit shortcomings in 
representing the real world. A major  critical point of the Homo Oeconomicus-
approach is the assumption of complete information since humans only dispose of 
limited  cognitive  capacities for collecting, storing, retrieving  and  processing Chapter 2_Theoretical framework 
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information. Economists call this “bounded rationality” (Simon 2008). To collect 
information is costly: one has to pay for information or to collect it  oneself by 
spending scarce time.  
Regarding the collection of information on quality attributes of goods, economists 
differentiate three categories according to the costs of collecting this information: 
search qualities, experience qualities and credence qualities (Nelson 1970; Darby 
and Karni 1973). Search qualities can be evaluated at low cost before the 
purchase, e.g. the colour of a tomato. Experience qualities cannot be checked 
before the purchase, but easily afterwards, e.g. the taste of a tomato. Credence 
qualities of a good cannot reliably be assessed by the consumer, neither before 
nor after buying the good, e.g. the organic quality of a tomato which results from 
the production process (Lippert 2005)
7. The consumer has to rely on the organic 
claim or labelling  of  an organic food product
8
Lack of information and asymmetric information can result in market failure. 
Market failure refers to situations when markets cannot fulfil their function of 
allocating resources optimally. In cases when the buyer is not fully informed on the 
characteristics of a good (quality uncertainty), she/he  will orientate her/his 
willingness to pay at the unknown expectable average quality. If in such a situation 
high quality goods cannot be produced at the price consumers are willing to pay 
(based on the quality they expect to get), these products would be forced out of 
the market. This is called adverse selection, since only the low quality market 
would  persist  (Akerlof 1970). This problem of quality uncertainty is especially 
important for credence goods like organic goods (Giannakas 2002).  
, since she/he cannot verify the 
information  about the quality.  The producer on the other side possesses all 
relevant information on the organic quality, since only he knows how the good was 
produced.  In this constellation, the information on the product quality is 
asymmetrically distributed between seller and buyer.  
Third party certification is a viable solution to sort out the problem of quality 
uncertainty related to organic food (Golan et al. 2001; Giannakas 2002). Without 
certification, consumers would face severe quality uncertainty and high potential 
for mislabelling. Consumers willing to buy organic food would face huge 
information costs in order to reliably  check the organic quality. The certifier as 
independent third party next to the producer and consumer provides the quality 
information  based on the European regulation on organic food (the standard) 
which is enforced by the control system and the governmental supervision. The 
corresponding labelling can be a useful tool for producers to signal organic quality 
to consumers in a way that the latter can reliably identify organic food.  
                                            
7 Lippert further distinguished credence goods into goods whose quality could be assessed by an “expert 
buyer” at high costs and goods with “immaterial credence quality” whose quality could not reliably be 
assessed even by an expert buyer. His examples for the process quality are the compliance with social or 
animal welfare standards, which cannot be tested on the product itself.  
8 Giannakas expressed this very simple: “consumers do not know whether a product is organic unless they 
are told so” (Giannakas 2002). Chapter 2_Theoretical framework 
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2.2.2   Transaction cost economics 
9
Organic food products are credence goods (Darby and Karni 1973). Due to the 
information asymmetry illustrated above, certification is necessary. Certification is 
seen as an instrument that can reduce the costs related to the exchange of a good, 
which are called transaction costs (Williamson 1985). The idea that exchanging 
a good (commodity or service) is costly is pivotal for the concept of New 
Institutional Economics.  
 
The existence of transaction costs is caused by bounded rationality (see also 
Chapter  2.2.1) and  potential  opportunism  sometimes along with asset 
specificity. Since nobody is fully informed (bounded rationality),  “frictions” 
(Furubotn and Richter 2005)  occur  when goods and services are exchanged. 
Opportunism means that humans are self-interested and likely to be dishonest (e.g. 
by “lying, stealing, cheating” (Williamson 1985)) to be better off. The concept of 
opportunistic behaviour is of specific relevance in the case of organic food 
products, since there is a considerable price premium compared to conventional 
products in combination with the credence quality. Economically spoken, there are 
“incentives for the mislabelling of conventional food as organic” (Giannakas 2002). 
The combination of bounded rationality and  the risk of opportunism activates 
uncertainty and results in considerable transaction costs.  
Transaction costs can be reduced by implementing an organic standard against 
which products are controlled and certified. Pivotal for the function of a certification 
system is the enforcement including penalties in case of non-compliance in order 
to strengthen truthful claims (Golan et al. 2001). By the implementation of such a 
control  system,  uncertainty  is  reduced  and consumers can easily and reliably 
identify organic products. Hereby, the existence of the organic market is assured 
and transaction costs are lowered, although such a system still induces substantial 
costs.  
The following section aims to structure and define the different types of transaction 
costs, which are specifically relevant for organic producers. The estimation of the 
costs of the organic certification system will be performed in work package 2 of the 
CERTCOST project.  
Transaction costs 
The concept of Transaction Cost Economics is widely applied in different areas. 
However, empirical application in terms of exemplary breakdown or even cost 
estimation  can rarely be found (Furubotn and Richter 2005). Wang (2003) 
provides a short, but comprehensive overview on the diverse utilisation of 
transaction cost measurements in different economic fields. Fundamental studies 
in transaction cost economics are discussed and integrated in the textbook 
“Institutions & Economic Theory” by Furubotn and Richter (2005).  
                                            
9 This section draws upon “Organic farming certification – the costs of reducing transaction costs” (Zorn 2008), 
a presentation held in September 2008 at  the “18. Jahrestagung der Österreichischen Gesellschaft für 
Agrarökonomie“ in Vienna/Austria.  Chapter 2_Theoretical framework 
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Occurrence and types of transaction costs 
We define the term transaction costs as the cost related to the exchange of an 
organic food product not including the cost of the good itself.
10
•  market transaction costs,  
 Transaction costs 
occur in different forms and with specific  characteristics: they can either be 
variable or fix, appear as cash-based or as opportunity costs. Basic categories 
of transaction costs are:  
•  managerial transaction costs, and  
•  political transaction costs (Furubotn and Richter 2005).  
Market transaction costs 
The most important category of transaction costs for organic certification systems 
is market transaction costs. These are defined as costs of using the market as 
point of exchange. In general, four categories of market transaction costs are 
distinguished:  
1)  search and information costs,  
2)  bargaining and decision costs,  
3)  supervision and enforcement costs, and  
4)  costs for investments in social relations (Furubotn and Richter 2005). 
Organic certification systems intend to lower market transaction costs by providing 
reliable certification. Certification lowers considerably the search and information 
costs and the supervision and enforcement costs of consumers. By certification 
and according labelling, consumers can easily and reliably identify organic food 
products. Controlling (supervising) the organic quality is done by professional 
experts. Although controls are costly, performing these in a certification system is 
cheaper compared to a situation where every organic food consumers would have 
to check the organic quality her-/himself – which beyond that is quite difficult for a 
non-expert. Therefore, the market transaction costs related to the exchange of a 
good are considered most important.  
The market transaction costs and the specific costs of using the organic market 
will be structured in the following part.  
Search and information costs 
Before the actual exchange can take place, the seller has to find a buyer and 
exchange information on the good, e.g. its quality  and price, and collect 
information on the buyer, e.g. the credibility or the solvency of the buyer. In this 
regard, there exists only a small difference in the search and information costs 
between non-organic and organic markets.  However,  higher search and 
information costs may arise due to asset specificity since the organic sector is still 
relatively small (organic producers, for example, may need to put more effort in 
finding a certified processor, or a distributor of a particular distribution channel).  
                                            
10 Alternative definitions of transaction costs are given by Furubotn/Richter (2005).  Chapter 2_Theoretical framework 
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Specific for organic farming is the duty to keep updated on the ever changing 
requirements of the organic standards. This requires considerable efforts by the 
organic operators  (Schmid 2005; Koesling et al. 2008).  E.g. because the 
requirements for using inputs like fertilisers and plant protection products are very 
detailed, related search and information costs are assumed to be higher in organic 
farming than in conventional farming.  
Bargaining and decision costs 
These costs occur when bargaining e.g. prices and other conditions of a trade and 
deciding for or against it. The more complex an exchange, the higher are its 
bargaining and decision costs. This cost category is considered to be of similar 
magnitude  in transactions of organic and non-organic products, although the 
relatively small organic market (in comparison to conventional food markets) could 
result in higher bargaining and decision costs.  
Supervision and enforcement costs 
The category of supervision and enforcement costs, however, are unique in the 
organic product case. A compulsory system of supervision and enforcement for 
the organic market, the inspection and certification system, has been designed 
and implemented by the EU organic regulation, Council Regulation (EC) No 
834/2007. This system ties up market access to ex-ante inspection and 
certification. Hereby, the duty of supervising organic quality is to a large extent 
transferred from the buyer to the seller. This differs from the usual classification of 
supervision costs in the literature as ex-post transaction costs.  
In order to be certified organic, a farmer has e.g. to commission a certification 
body, to fulfil specific documentation requirements or to apply for an exception in 
case of need. These specific requirements add up to considerable costs, either 
cash-based (e.g. the certification fees) or opportunity costs (e.g. the utility 
foregone for the time spent on documentation).  
Setting up, maintaining and running a private control system can also be seen as 
supervision and enforcement costs, since participation is voluntary.  
Costs for investments in social relations 
These costs occur e.g. when meeting clients in order to foster relations and to 
build up a trustful relationship. These types of relations are of special importance 
within the organic sector, where the so-called direct marketing exists as a viable 
solution for selling. Therefore, one could assume these costs being higher than in 
non-organic systems.  
Political transaction costs 
Any transaction, either intra-firm or market transaction, occurs in a well designed 
institutional system of a polity. Setting up, maintaining and changing, i.e. 
administrating this system is costly (Furubotn and Richter 2005). With regard to 
organic farming, the costs of implementing an organic control system can be 
regarded as administration costs. A good and up-to-date example for a small 
fragment of these costs, are the public but also private resources spent in the Chapter 2_Theoretical framework 
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process of revising Regulation (EEC) No. 2092/91 and deciding on Regulation (EC) 
No. 834/2007 on organic production and labelling.  
Managerial transaction costs 
Managerial transaction costs  represent the costs related to the intra-firm 
exchange of goods. Miller and Vollmann (1985) refer to the “hidden factory”, which 
exists inside the firm next to manufacturing (therefore hidden) to point out the high 
importance of these costs.  
The two tables on the following pages structure  the  market  and political 
transactions costs using two examples. Transaction costs considered specific for 
organic trade are highlighted in the tables.  Chapter 2_Theoretical framework 
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Table 1:  Structuring market transaction costs – example A: Farmer selling tomatoes to consumers  Chapter 2_Theoretical framework 
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Table 2:  Structuring market transaction costs – example B: Farmer selling tomatoes to a processor Chapter 2_Theoretical framework 
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2.3  Economics of crime  
Economists take an interest in costs and benefits; this perspective is also relevant 
regarding the economic analysis of crime. In the case of organic farming, “crime” 
directly  refers  to  the conscious severe non-compliance  with the EU regulation 
respectively  with private standards, in the following called fraud. The economic 
analysis refers to the costs and benefits of crime, which are analysed both from 
the perspective of an individual and from the societal level.  
According to the economics of crime, opportunistic  individuals decide between 
complying with a law or not based on rational considerations by comparing the 
total pay-off of the two alternatives  (Eide 2000). The fundamental relevance of 
these theoretical considerations for the organic control systems derives from 
Council Regulation (EC) No 834/2007, Art. 27: this article requires that “nature and 
frequency of the controls shall be determined on the basis of an assessment of the 
risk  of occurrence of irregularities  and  infringements  as regards compliance 
with the requirements laid down in this Regulation.”  This means, that the 
Regulation requires that the control body considers  the risk of an operator 
committing fraud, when determining the number and kind of controls (risk based 
control).  Based on economic theory, the main influencing  factors  whether  an 
opportunistic individual will commit organic fraud or not is illustrated in this chapter.  
The  asymmetric information  between buyer and seller obviously increases the 
propensity to opportunism. Therefore, there is a fundamental possibility for fraud 
connected to the marketing of organic food products. This assumption does not 
mean that fraud is omnipresent among organic farmers and producers. It rather 
refers to certain risks, which are constrained  by formal and informal rules 
(institutions), that structure and order economic actions. Examples of fraud can be 
mislabelling of conventional as organic food (including commingling) in order to 
obtain the organic price premium (Gesellschaft für Ressourcenschutz (GfRS) 2003) 
or  using forbidden inputs (e.g. pesticides, fertilisers, additives) during the 
production process, in order to reduce costs and / or to increase the yield.  
Based on Becker’s model on the “supply of offences” (Becker 1968), the factors 
determining organic fraud are illustrated:  
1)  the income (monetary profit) of an offence,  
2)  the probability that non-compliance is detected and,  
3)  the penalty (monetary fine plus other sanctions) in case of detection and the 
according punishment. An opportunistic individual decides by comparing the 
expected utility of the alternatives complying with the standard or cheating, 
given the determinants above.  
The income of crime  
The income of an organic fraud results either from decreasing costs or increasing 
benefit. This varies across areas of production, products, and operators and in the 
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The opportunistic individual compares the expected utility resulting from present 
and future incomes in the case of either complying with the organic standard or 
cheating. Compliance will result in an income based on regular production costs 
and organic prices and quantities. The expected utility from non-compliance 
results from two shares: first the  discounted
11
If the individual wants to act on the organic market in the future,  she/he  has 
equally to consider potential future benefits and costs by discounting these. The 
interest rate used for discounting future cash flows differs between individuals – 
economists say, that  they exhibit different time preferences. This is of high 
importance, since a high time preference  (focus on present income) implies a 
higher risk of fraud: e.g. somebody in financial problems (high time preference) 
could be tempted to solve these problems by cheating, neglecting the risk of 
potential reputation loss and the resulting future income losses. A fundamental 
calculation of an opportunistic individual comparing the expected utility from 
complying and from cheating is illustrated in Box 1. 
  income  stream  from successful 
cheating  and, second, the discounted  income  stream  from revealed cheating 
including penalties. These shares are weighted by the assumed  probability of 
being detected and the probability of undetected cheating, yielding the expected 
utility of non-compliance. The opportunistic individual will opt for the alternative, 
whose utility is expected to be higher.  
Decision situation of an opportunistic individual comparing the expected utility from the 
income from 
a) complying with the standard and  
b) not complying with the standard  
a) Compliance   b) Non-compliance  
EUc = U (Yc
NPV EU )   nc = (1-w) U(Ynd
NPV) + w U(Yd
NPV
  with  
) 
  with  
EU Expected utility in case of compliance  c  EU Expected utility in case of non-compliance  nc 
U  Utility   Ynd Net present value of today’s and future 
income when never detected 
NPV 
Yc Net present value of today’s and future 
income when always complying  
NPV  Yd Net present value of today’s and future 
income when detected 
NPV 
    w  Detection probability  
Box 1: Decision situation of an opportunistic individual.  
The income illustrated in the formulas in Box 1 is dependent on many factors. 
Among others, important factors are the prices of organic and conventional 
products, the quantities yielded by different production processes (e.g. compliant 
vs. non-compliant production), the costs of production, the discount rate (cf. above) 
and the fine in case of detection (cf. below).  
The probability that crime is detected  
The probability that organic fraud is detected is also very relevant for the decision 
making of an opportunistic individual. Whether fraud is detected or not, is mainly 
determined by the kind of infringement and the control system. Some 
infringements like the use of forbidden substances may be detected by sample 
analysis, whereas others, e.g. commingling with a conventional fraction without 
                                            
11 Future incomes have to be discounted in order to obtain their present value.  Chapter 2_Theoretical framework 
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pesticide residues, are very difficult to detect. The control system can affect the 
detection probability by the frequency  and kind of controls  (unannounced vs. 
announced), the selection of operators for additional controls as required by the 
concept of risk-based controls, the qualification of the inspectors  and their 
elaborateness. The magnitude of these factors will be further analysed based on 
data on organic controls of control bodies in work package 4 of CERTCOST.  
The penalty  
The penalty can consist of financial, psychic and social sanctions. Prosecution of 
fraud in organic trade is performed by the judicial system of the Member States, so 
the national law applies and there is no uniform sanction system. Financial 
sanctioning of fraud can be a direct penalty, the reclaim of agri-environmental 
payments and future losses (e.g. prohibition of marketing organic products for a 
certain period of time) and can relatively easily be measured. Psychic and social 
sanctions can be the loss of reputation and esteem of others or the restriction in 
freedom due to imprisonment. To compare different kinds of fines, the psychic and 
social sanctions have to be converted into monetary equivalents. The monetary 
value of an imprisonment may be calculated as the sum of discounted earnings 
foregone and the –  individually different –  value of the restriction in freedom 
(Becker 1968).  
Increasing the detection probability, e.g. by altering the control system, or 
increasing the fine would lower the expected utility of cheating and accordingly the 
number of frauds. However, controls as well as enforcement and fines are costly 
(e.g. the costs of lawsuits or imprisonment);  consequently the question of  the 
optimal level of detection probability and penalties arises. In order to determine the 
optimum, the social costs of fraud have to be considered. In case of mislabelling of 
organic food, the damage a consumer faces is not easily determined (Stigler 1970; 
Scheerer et al. 2007), but is at least the price difference between the organic and 
the conventional product. Societal damage could result from foregone positive 
external effects
12
Supervision and Enforcement  
 that result from organic production. From a social perspective, 
the  variables  that can be influenced  are  the  detection probability and the  fine 
(penalty). Their optimum level is given by the minimum of the cost sum of (i) the 
total costs of fraud (damage from cheating), (ii) the costs of controls, prosecution 
and conviction and (iii) the costs of the punishment (e.g. imprisonment) (Becker 
1968; for a first application of his approach to organic farming controls, see Lippert 
et al. 2009).  
The supervision of the control bodies is an important tool to guarantee a 
functioning control system. This especially applies for competitive control markets 
with some or many different control bodies offering their service (Zorn and Renner 
2008). In countries where operators can choose between many control bodies (e.g. 
                                            
12 Positive external effects are of organic farming are for example positive environmental contributions of this 
farming system. Externalities by definition are not reflected in the price of a good. If the non-compliance with 
regard to an organic standard consists in using forbidden pesticides, the positive environmental effects cannot 
be attained.  Chapter 2_Theoretical framework 
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Germany with 22 or Italy with 20 control bodies) this is of high relevance. Here, 
operators can change to another control body in case of dissatisfaction with the 
service provided or the result of the control (e.g. the way controls are performed or 
penalties are given). Supervision of controls and harmonisation  of penalties is 
important in order to guarantee equal conditions for all organic operators.  
Another crucial point is the enforcement of Council Regulation (EC) No 834/2007, 
since imperfect enforcement can lower the cost of punishment and hereby also 
lower the deterrence of operators from cheating. The responsibility for prosecution 
lies with the member states (Giannakas 2002). The costs of prosecution can differ 
between Member States and so can jurisdiction, with regard to the penalties. 
Organic farming is sometimes still called a niche market. Apparently, that applies 
to organic fraud lawsuits, too,  where decision making can require specific 
knowledge necessary for correct enforcement of the laws.  
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3 BENEFITS AND COSTS OF ORGANIC 
CERTIFICATION 
 
The relevance of the costs of an organic certification system in the EU according 
to the Council Regulation (EC) No 834/2007 came up when discussing the optimal 
level of controls and sanctions. From a societal viewpoint, the implementation of 
such an extensive control system only makes sense, when the benefits exceed the 
costs of the system. The same applies to private standards  and  their 
implementation. Nevertheless, a considerable number of private organic standards 
and a huge number of public and private control bodies are involved in organic 
certification.  
At present, only a few studies exist on the costs of organic certification (Mora and 
Menozzi 2005; Santacoloma 2007b; Santacoloma 2007a)  and  on  quality 
assurance schemes in general (Krieger et al. 2007). These studies cover  only 
parts of the system costs and benefits, leaving room for improvement.  
This chapter aims to illustrate the most important categories of costs and benefits 
accompanying organic certification. Costs and benefits from organic certification 
appear as monetary (cash-based) and non-monetary values (Krieger et al. 2007). 
Non-monetary values may partially be converted into monetary values, e.g. by 
using the concept of opportunity costs (time units spent multiplied by the expected 
income per time unit), but they are generally tricky to evaluate.  
3.1  Costs of organic certification  
The fact that thousands of operators opt for the organic control systems implies 
that they assess a positive balance of costs and benefits. The financial burden 
from organic certification services is estimated to amount to 1.5% of organic retail 
turnover (Rundgren 2001). For European organic producers this would correspond 
 Chapter 3_Benefits and costs of organic certification 
 
 
27 
 
to more than 200 Mio. Euro for the year 2006.
13
Generally, it is very difficult to provide reliable estimates for the costs of organic 
certification. This is mainly due to the different types of costs, i.e. monetary vs. 
non-monetary costs, of which especially the latter are difficult to survey. Some 
costs cannot completely be accounted to organic production. Besides, it is difficult 
to identify the exact share, which accounts to organic production.  
 But this estimation only considers 
the cash-based costs (monetary expenditures) of certification. For the majority of 
organic operators, this is probably the most important share of the total costs, but 
other potentially significant burdens are not covered by this estimate.  
The workload connected to certification is a significant part of the costs next to 
cash-based costs.  Organic operators  spend a considerable amount of time, in 
order to satisfy the requirements, especially the documentation requirements laid 
down in Council Regulation (EC) No 834/2007 and in private organic standards. 
Numerous examples for monetary (cash-based) and non-monetary (opportunity) 
costs are given in tables 1 and 2 (see above, chapter 2.2.2), structured according 
to  transaction costs considerations.  Some of these  costs can be assigned to 
organic production exclusively (e.g. time spent on organic control visits), others 
serve different areas of an operation (e.g. documentation of incoming goods) and 
would also be carried out on a conventional farm.  
The differentiation between the costs for introducing the certification system in an 
operation (during conversion) and the actual costs related to certification of the 
operation is important. The relevance of individual cost types differs during the 
different stages. Monetary and non-monetary information costs for example, 
usually are usually very  high  when entering into and during conversion  of  an 
organic operation. When the operation has been certified organic for a few years, 
information costs will decrease to a common level as long as the production type 
stays the same.  
Transaction costs of the conversion of an operation, i.e. the costs of adapting the 
production and management processes to the  organic system requirements, 
highly depend on the starting point and the area of production. In the long run, 
these costs are sunk costs
14
Setting up, maintaining and changing the organic control system for public as well 
as private standards also results in organic certification costs. Part of these costs 
is borne by the operators paying certification fees. Another part is paid by the tax 
payers, e.g. for drafting, discussing and deciding on EU and national organic 
regulations or the administration and supervision of the control system. Private 
institutions  also bear costs relating to  their  contributions to the legislative 
procedure and for  establishing private certification systems. This applies to 
national and international organic associations, e.g. IFOAM and their members.  
 and will therefore not specifically be considered, in 
the CERTCOST project although they can form considerable cost sums.  
                                            
13 Zentrale Markt- und Preisberichtsstelle (ZMP 2008) reports the turnover of the European organic market to 
be 14.6 billion € in 2006. 
14 Sunk costs are costs incurred in the past which cannot be recovered. An example is a building with only one 
specific usage. Sunk costs are irrelevant for decisions.  Chapter 3_Benefits and costs of organic certification 
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The issue of organic certification costs and their distribution will be analysed in 
detail in work package 2 of the CERTCOST project.  
3.2  Benefits of organic certification 
Due to the specific characteristics of organic food products (see also  2.2.1), 
governmental action is essential  to ensure the organic market and to protect 
producers from unfair competition as well as consumers’ interest by defining what 
exactly characterises organic food. Functioning markets fulfil important functions, 
assuring society’s interests (efficient allocation of resources, welfare), as well as 
operators’ (competition and differentiation) and consumers’ interests (satisfying 
their demand for organic products). Furthermore, organic production delivers 
public goods to the society contributing to environmental protection and rural 
development. The regulatory governmental action of the European Union is based 
upon this “dual societal role” of organic food and farming (EC 2007, preamble).  
An organic standard and its effective implementation fulfils  important economic 
functions  (Will and Guenther 2007). By defining basic requirements, organic 
standards  facilitate coordination along the supply chain. Furthermore, these 
standards lower transaction costs considerably.  
Operators experience different benefits from certification. Most important is the 
assurance of the organic market and the access to it, offering the possibility to 
differentiate from other producers. By successful certification, operators are able to 
benefit from consumers’ usually higher willingness  to pay for organic products. 
Council Regulation (EC) No 834/2007 has the function of a minimum quality 
standard, organic food products have to comply with. Hereby, fair competition 
between producers is ensured, since every organic food product has to comply at 
least with this basic standard.  
The documentation requirements of organic certification may have advantages in 
relation to the daily management (Kontogeorgos and Semos 2008). For example, 
the inspection of incoming goods, which is of specific relevance for organic 
operators, has somehow to be performed by every operator. In case of organic 
certification, this inspection has to meet certain requirements and hereby leads to 
a structured and well documented approach. The resulting documentation and 
transparent, well-structured processes may  have positive effects on  other 
managerial tasks, e.g. by reducing rework (e.g. documentation for quality 
assurance schemes or traceability) and saving costs (Krieger et al. 2007).  
For consumers, organic labelling is an effective tool to overcome the information 
problem illustrated in chapter 2.2.1. By exactly defining what makes up organic 
food by setting up a standard, the costs of monitoring and enforcement of 
consumers  can  be reduced. Consumers  can identify easily  and  at low costs 
organic food products and satisfy their demand. Given market transparency by a 
standard and consumers’ confidence in the control system, organic markets can 
further develop and grow (McCluskey 2000).  
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The application of economic concepts to organic certification is of high relevance 
for the CERTCOST project. Using economic concepts allowed us to structure and 
explain what we observe in the real world of organic food. When formulating the 
project’s final results, economic theory can provide a basis for recommendations 
on how to further improve the European organic certification system.  
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ANNEX: GLOSSARY  
 
This glossary compiles terms relevant for the project CERTCOST and separates 
them into two parts: Part A - Inspection and certification and Part B - Economic 
terms
The terms regarding inspection and certification (Part A) were gathered from 
existing regulations, publications and glossaries and then analysed. Primarily 
considered were definitions given in public documents of the European Union, 
especially the Council Regulation (EC) No 834/2007. In addition, the glossary is 
based upon publications from the following institutions:  
.  
•  Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO),  
•  Codex Alimentarius Commission (CAC),  
•  International Task Force on Harmonisation and Equivalence in Organic 
Agriculture (ITF), convened by FAO, IFOAM and UNCTAD, the United 
Nations Conference on Trade and Development,  
•  International Federation of Organic Agricultural Movements (IFOAM),  
•  United States National Organic Program (NOP),  
•  Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ) – a private German 
institution for technical cooperation linked to the German Federal Ministry 
for Economic Cooperation and Development.  
 
Part B is based on basic economic literature and illustrates terms and concepts 
relevant for the CERTCOST project.  
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GLOSSARY PART A –  
INSPECTION AND CERTIFICATION 
 
 
Term  Definition / description  
Accreditation  Procedure by which an authoritative body (this can either be a 
public or a private accreditation body) gives a formal 
recognition that a body is competent to provide inspection and 
certification services (International Task Force (ITF) 2007). In 
the European Union, organic control bodies have to be 
accredited to European Standard EN 45011 or ISO Guide 65.  
Approval  Procedure by which a body (other than an accreditation body) 
gives a formal recognition that a body or person is competent 
to carry out specific tasks (International Task Force (ITF) 
2007).  
Following Council Regulation (EC) No 834/2007, Article 
27(4b), the competent authority from a member state shall 
approve  organic  control bodies before they can offer their 
services. The method and criteria how to approve control 
bodies are laid down by the European Commission (Council 
Regulation (EC) No 834/2007, Article 38).  
Certificate  A certificate in the context of organic food and farming is a 
document certifying an operator that she/he has fulfilled the 
requirements of an organic standard. This document is issued 
by the control body after having controlled an operation 
declaring that it is in conformity with the organic production or 
processing standards. Therefore, the term certificate of 
conformity is used.  
A certificate serves as communication between seller and 
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buyer in contrast to a label, which is a form of communication 
to the consumer (Dankers and Liu 2003).  
For transactions between certified organic operators, a lot is 
accompanied by a transaction certificate. This kind of 
certificate is compulsory for imports to the European Union. 
The EU differentiates the transaction certificates in the trade 
of organic products with third countries: For the import of 
compliant products, “documentary evidence” is required in 
order to identify the “operator who carried out the last 
operation” and to verify the compliance of the product 
imported with Council Regulation (EC) No 834/2007. When 
importing equivalent products, a “certificate of inspection” is 
required.  
Certification  Procedure by which a certification or control authority or body 
(a third party) gives written assurance that a product, process 
or service is in conformity with certain  standards  (Codex 
Alimentarius Commission 1995), is called certification.  
Certification 
body 
Organisation that conducts certification.  See also “Control 
body”.  
Commingling  “Physical contact between unpackaged organically produced 
and non-organically produced agricultural products during 
production, processing, transportation, storage or handling, 
other than during the manufacture of a multi-ingredient 
product containing both types of ingredients” (United States 
Department of Agriculture -  Agricultural Marketing Service 
2000).  
Competent 
authority 
Following the definition in the Council Regulation (EC) No 
834/2007, the competent authority is the “central authority of a 
Member State competent for the organisation of official 
controls in the field of organic production in accordance with 
the provisions set out under this Regulation, or any other 
authority on which that competence has been conferred to; it 
shall also include, where appropriate, the corresponding 
authority of a third country”. 
Compliance  Compliance is fulfilling specific requirements, like e.g. the 
production rules of Council Regulation (EC) No 834/2007.  
In trading of organic foods with third countries, the European 
organic regulation differentiates between compliant products 
(Article 32) and equivalent products (Article 33). When 
importing into the EU via Article 32, the production and control 
have to comply with Council Regulation (EC) No 834/2007. In 
the case of equivalence, imports via Article 33 require 
equivalent production rules and equivalent control 
effectiveness. ANNEX_Glossary 
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Control,  
 
Synonyms:  
Inspection 
(NOP),  
Audit (FAO)  
An on-site visit of operators in order to verify that their 
performance is in accordance with a particular set of 
production or processing standards is called control (Dankers 
and Liu 2003; International Task Force (ITF) 2007).  
Controls can be categorised into announced and 
unannounced controls. Furthermore, the following types of 
controls are differentiated (Rundgren 2007):  
An initial control
A 
 is the first visit to an operator who is in the 
process of converting to organic. This first visit usually is 
more time-consuming than routine controls, since a lot of 
data has to be collected.  
routine or regular control
A 
 is a physical inspection of an 
operator and usually is scheduled (announced) but can also 
occur as an unannounced inspection. The key aspects of an 
operation are examined during a routine control. Since this 
kind of control usually is performed once a year, it is also 
called an annual control.  
random or spot-check control
A 
  is conducted primarily 
unannounced. Random controls shall be based on the risk 
of non-compliance with the organic standard, previous 
control results, the quantity of products concerned and the 
risk for exchange of products according to Commission 
Regulation (EC) No 889/2008, Article 65(4).  
follow-up control
Control authority 
 results from another precedent control. 
The reasons for a follow-up control are varied. Such a 
control has got the character of a sanction, if an operation 
was not perfectly prepared for certification during the routine 
control or the certification body has required the control of 
corrective actions, which should be implemented.  
Council Regulation (EC) No 834/2007, Article 2(o), defines the 
control authority as follows: “public administrative organisation 
of a Member State to which the competent authority has 
conferred, in whole or in part, its competence for the 
inspection and certification in the field of organic production in 
accordance with the provisions set out under this Regulation; 
it shall also include, where appropriate, the corresponding 
authority of a third country or the corresponding authority 
operating in a third country”. 
Control body  “Independent private third party carrying out inspection and 
certification” Council Regulation (EC) No 834/2007, Article 
2(p).  
In Council Regulation (EC) No 834/2007 on organic 
production and labelling of organic products, the term control 
body is used throughout. This regulation does neither use the 
term ‘inspection body’ (which was used in the Council ANNEX_Glossary 
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Regulation (EEC) 2092/91) nor ‘certification body’.  
The certification process is sometimes divided into inspection 
(visiting and controlling operators) and  certification (issuing 
the certificate). Accordingly the different institutions carrying 
out the different jobs are distinguished as the inspection body 
(body performing the inspection part of certification. Where a 
certification body performs its own inspections, the 
certification body is both the inspection body (Dankers and Liu 
2003)) and the certification body
See also  “Control authority”  for public bodies that are in 
charge of inspection and certification.  
  (organisation performing 
certifications; the certification body may use an existing 
standard or  may set its own standard, based on an 
international and/or normative standard (Dankers and Liu 
2003; International Task Force (ITF) 2007)).  
Control label  Label or symbol indicating that compliance with specific 
standards has been verified. The use of a label is controlled 
by the standard-setting body (e.g. the European Commission, 
national governments or private organic associations). Labels 
serve as information for consumers and can help them to 
identify organic products (Dankers and Liu 2003). 
Conversion  “Conversion means the transition from non organic to organic 
farming within a given period of time, during which the 
provisions concerning the organic production have been 
applied” Council Regulation (EC) No 834/2007 Article 2(h).  
Documentary 
evidence  
Specific term for the transaction certificate required for the 
import of compliant organic products (Art. 32 of Council 
Regulation (EC) No 834/2007) into to European Union.  
Equivalence  When describing different systems or measures, equivalence 
means that they are “capable of meeting the same objectives 
and principles by applying rules which ensure the same level 
of assurance of conformity” (compared to Council Regulation 
(EC) No 834/2007, Article 2(x)). The EC definition relates 
both, to third countries and to control bodies. For each 
category, a list will be compiled with equivalent certification 
systems respectively control measures (Council Regulation 
(EC) No 834/2007, Article 33). See also “Compliance”. 
The ITF defines equivalence as “acceptance that different 
standards or technical regulations on the same subject fulfil 
common objectives” (International Task Force (ITF) 2007).  
EN 45011  See “ISO 65”. 
Harmonisation  Harmonisation is the process by which standards, technical 
regulations and conformity assessment on the same subject 
approved by different bodies establishes inter-changeability of ANNEX_Glossary 
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products and processes. The process aims at the 
establishment of identical standards, technical regulations and 
conformity assessment requirements (International Task 
Force (ITF) 2007).  
Horizontal 
standard 
Horizontal standards entail rules that apply across the food 
chain, ranging from farm to fork like e.g. standards on 
labelling, food hygiene (Will and Guenther 2007).  
Infringement  Severe case of non-compliance with Council Regulation (EC) 
No 834/2007 and the corresponding international and national 
implementing rules. See also “Non-compliance”.  
Inspection   See “Control”.  
Inspection body  See “Control body”.  
Irregularity  Case of minor  non-compliance with regulation Council 
Regulation (EC) No 834/2007  and the corresponding 
international and national implementing rules. See also “Non-
compliance”. 
ISO 65            _   
(EN 45011) 
ISO is the abbreviation for the International Organization of 
Standardization, a non-governmental organisation. The 
abbreviation ISO is derived from the Greek word isos (equal). 
ISO does not certify nor accredit, it only sets standards for 
sectors, quality  management and conformity assessments 
systems.  
ISO Guide 65 on “general requirements for bodies operating a 
product-certification system” describes in general the 
requirements for documentation, quality management and 
internal review in a certification body. This guide is not specific 
for organic certification. The European and Japanese organic 
regulations refer to ISO 65 as compulsory for a control body. 
The European Norm (EN) 45011 is identical to ISO Guide 65 
(Rundgren 2007).  
Inspector   The person appointed to undertake the inspection is called the 
inspector. It may be an independent operator or an employee 
of the control or inspection body. Sometimes, the inspector is 
also called the auditor (Dankers and Liu 2003). 
Labelling  Council Regulation (EC) No 834/2007, Article 2(k)  defines 
labelling as “any terms, words, particulars, trademarks, brand 
name, pictorial matter or symbol relating to and placed on any 
packaging, document, notice, label, board, ring or collar 
accompanying or referring to a product”.  
National Organic 
Program (NOP) 
“The National Organic Program (NOP) develops, implements, 
and administers national production, handling, and labeling 
standards for organic agricultural products” in the United 
States of America. “The NOP also accredits the certifying ANNEX_Glossary 
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agents (foreign and domestic) who inspect organic production 
and handling operations to certify that they meet USDA 
standards.”  (United States Department of Agriculture - 
Agricultural Marketing Service 2008). The NOP came into 
force in October 2001.  
Non-compliance 
 
Synonym:  
Non-conformity  
“Any situation or action that leads to the operator’s or 
production’s not fulfilling in some way the standards or the 
requirements set”  is defined as non-compliance. Non-
compliance can be classified and described by many terms, 
among them non-conformities, “deficiencies, violations, 
transgressions, infringements, irregularities, fraud and 
deviation” (Rundgren 2007).  
Council Regulation (EC) No 834/2007 does not provide 
definitions of the terms non-compliance, infringement and 
irregularity with regard to organic production standards, 
although these terms are used in the European organic 
regulation. In Article 30, the consequences in terms of severity 
of an irregularity and an infringement are differentiated. In 
case of an irregularity, the EU regulation foresees that no 
reference to organic shall be made on the affected product or 
lot. In case of a severe infringement, the operator may not be 
allowed to market organic products for a specified period.  
For CERTCOST, we want to use the term non-compliance as 
generic term for any violation of Council Regulation (EC) No 
834/2007. Non-compliance can further be differentiated into 
rather slight violations, called irregularities, and serious 
violations of the regulation, called infringements.  
Operator  Operator means any person –  natural or legal –  who 
produces, prepares or imports, with a view to the subsequent 
marketing thereof, food products, or who markets such 
products (Codex Alimentarius Commission 2007a).  
The current EU organic regulation (Council Regulation (EC) 
No 834/2007, Article 2(d)) introduced a new, more precise 
definition for the operator being the “natural or legal persons 
responsible for ensuring that the requirements of this 
Regulation are met within the organic business under their 
control.”  
The activities covered entail the production, preparation, 
storage, import and marketing (distribution) of organic 
products. 
Preparation  Preparation “means the operations of preserving and/or 
processing of organic products, including slaughter and 
cutting for livestock products, and also packaging, labelling 
and/or alterations made to the labelling concerning the organic 
production  method” (Council Regulation (EC) No 834/2007, ANNEX_Glossary 
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Article 2(i)).  
Private standard   Private standards are set by private actors while the 
government or its public agencies may have issued national 
public standards, i.e. regulations and guidelines, which may 
be stricter than Council Regulation (EC) No 834/2007. Private 
standards exist on regional, national and international levels 
for food products (Will and Guenther 2007). In the organic 
sector, these standards are set by growers’ associations, 
umbrella organisations and sometimes by certain certification 
bodies. 
Private organic standards are often stricter in some areas than 
Council Regulation (EC) No 834/2007 which has the function 
of a minimum organic quality standard.
15
Processing 
  Associations and 
companies can use private standards in order to differentiate 
their products from competitors and to enhance their relative 
market position. Private standards can become a de-facto-
minimum quality standard, when their market significance is 
very high.  
In the NOP, processing is defined as: “Cooking, baking, 
curing, heating, drying, mixing, grinding, churning, separating, 
extracting, slaughtering, cutting, fermenting, distilling, 
eviscerating, preserving, dehydrating, freezing, chilling, or 
otherwise manufacturing and includes the packaging, canning, 
jarring, or otherwise enclosing food in a container”  (United 
States Department of Agriculture -  Agricultural Marketing 
Service 2000). 
The European food legislation, i.e. both the Regulation (EC) 
No 178/2002 on the general principles and requirements of 
food law and the Council Regulation (EC) No 834/2007, does 
not provide a definition of processing.  
Regulation  Following the differentiation of the World Trade Organization, 
mandatory rules are called (technical) regulations in 
separation from a standard to which compliance is not 
mandatory (Bonsi et al. 2008). 
Risk  Risk is understood differently in different regulations. The 
European basic food law defines risk as “a function of the 
probability of an adverse health effect and the severity of that 
effect, consequential to a hazard” (Regulation (EC) No 
178/2002, Article 3(9)).  
                                            
15 The classification of Council Regulation (EC) No 834/2007 as minimum quality standard results from the 
requirement that every food product that is labelled “organic” has to comply with this regulation. Other organic 
standards in the European Union can only be stricter than Council Regulation (EC) No 834/2007. In areas of 
farming or processing, where other standards do not specify stricter or any rules, Council Regulation (EC) No 
834/2007 is directly effective.  ANNEX_Glossary 
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The Council Regulation (EC) No 834/2007 is one of the few if 
not the only within the important governmental organic 
regulations like NOP and JAS, that specifies the term risk. 
This regulation utilises the expression ‘risk’ in the sense of the 
probability of not fulfilling the organic regulation: “… risk of 
occurrence of irregularities and infringements as regards 
compliance with the requirements laid down in this 
Regulation” (Council Regulation (EC) No 834/2007, Article 27 
(3)). See also “Risk (economic)“ in Part B.  
Risk assessment  Risk assessment is the quantitative and if possible qualitative 
determination of risk.  
The general food law (Regulation (EC) No 178/2002) 
describes risk assessment as a “scientifically based process 
consisting of four steps: hazard identification, hazard 
characterisation, exposure assessment and risk 
characterisation”.  
In the context of an economic  investigation of the organic 
certification system, risk and accordingly its assessment has 
two components: The first component is the probability of non-
compliance with the provisions of the organic regulation. The 
second component is the (potential) damage generated by the 
different types of non-compliance (CERTCOST – Description 
of Work 2008).  
Risk based 
inspection 
Article 32 of Council Regulation (EC) No 834/2007 states that 
“The nature of the supervision shall be determined on the 
basis of an assessment of the risk of the occurrence of 
irregularities or infringements of the provisions set out in this 
Regulation”.  
Further specification of the Commission’s perception of risk is 
provided in Commission Regulation (EC) No 889/2008, Article 
65(4), laying down detailed rules for the implementation of 
Council Regulation (EC) No 834/2007. When defining how 
random control visits have to be carried out, this regulation 
wants the control body to base these visits on “the risk of non-
compliance with the organic production rules, taking into 
account at least the results of previous controls, the quantity 
of products concerned and the risk for exchange of products”.  
Risk 
management 
The process, distinct from risk assessment, of weighing 
alternative actions considering risk assessment and other 
factors relevant for irregularities, and, if needed, selecting 
appropriate prevention and control options (Codex 
Alimentarius Commission 2007b).  
Standard   A standard generally is something set up and established by 
authority as a rule for the measure of quantity, weight, extent, 
value, or quality (Merriam-Webster 2009).  ANNEX_Glossary 
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One distinguishes private from public, vertical from horizontal, 
and, mandatory from voluntary standards.  
Brunsson and Jacobsson (2000)  describe standards in a 
broader sense: “standards constitute rules about what those 
who adopt them should do”.  
The economic functions for standards can be the following:  
•  Facilitate coordination along the supply chain and 
hereby 
•  Enhance chain efficiency and  
•  Lower transaction costs (Will and Guenther 2007). 
Third-country list  Article 33(2), in Council Regulation (EC) No 834/2007, ‘Import 
of products providing equivalent guarantees’, refers to the list 
of countries “whose system of production complies with 
principles and production rules equivalent to those laid down 
in Titles II, III and IV and whose control measures are of 
equivalent effectiveness to those laid down in Title V […]. The 
assessment of equivalency shall take into account Codex 
Alimentarius guidelines CAC/GL 32”. In short, this list contains 
the non-EU countries that have been recognised as having an 
equivalent organic regulation to the European regulation.  
Traceability   Following the definition of Regulation (EC) No 178/2002 on 
the general principles and requirements of food law, 
traceability is “the ability to trace and follow a food, feed, food-
producing animal or substance intended to be, or expected to 
be incorporated into a food or feed, through all stages of 
production, processing and distribution”. 
Vertical standard  Vertical standard entails rules for a specified product or 
product group such as vegetables or wine (Will and Guenther 
2007).  ANNEX_Glossary 
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GLOSSARY PART B – ECONOMIC TERMS  
 
 
Term  Definition / description  
Administration 
costs  
In the context of the CERTCOST project, this term sums up all 
costs of administration in terms of implementing an organic 
control system, be it of private or public ownership. These are 
the costs for administration, i.e. setting up, maintaining  and 
changing this system. Thus, they are related to the 
governance structure of an organic control system. Depending 
on the responsibility, these costs occur as private (e.g. 
certification bodies’ costs for auditing and accreditation) and 
public costs, the latter are defined as political transaction 
costs. 
Assets 
Specificity 
Uniqueness or inimitability of what is being exchanged among 
actors. Higher level of specificity implies higher transaction 
costs. Hypothetically, if the assets were not unique, the actors’ 
capitals would be absolutely homogenous and actors would 
not establish any kind of permanent relationship or 
cooperation.  
Institutional Economics assumes that real-life transactions are 
always based on bounded rationality and potential 
opportunism of actors and also sometimes specificity of 
assets. All transactions are thus costly.  
   
Bounded 
rationality 
Behaviour that is intentionally rational, but only to a limited 
extent, because humans only dispose of limited capacities for 
collecting and processing information; hence fully rational 
decisions are not possible and uncertainty exists.  
Business costs  Precisely which kind of costs organic operators incur for 
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of certification   inspection and certification procedures takes centre stage in 
CERTCOST. The term business costs of certification sums up 
the total burden of organic operators caused by certification 
requirements. This includes transaction costs in the form of 
cash-based costs and opportunity costs (See also the tables 
on p. 20 f.).  
Cash-based 
costs  
Cash-based costs are related to cash flow for a realized 
purchase. Since the  purchase (exchange) of goods and 
services is directly linked to the corresponding expenditure, 
these costs can be precisely determined. Examples for cash-
based costs related to organic control are: the control fee paid 
to the control body or expenditures for specific software.  
Costs   Very generally, costs are a foregone utility. More precisely, 
costs are the evaluated consumption and usage of economic 
goods of material or immaterial kind in monetary units 
(Dabbert and Braun 2006).  
In the CERTCOST project, the following cost terms are of 
specific relevance and explained in this glossary:  
Cash-based costs  
Opportunity costs  
Transaction costs  
Administration costs  
Credence goods   Customers buying a credence good have less information on 
the utility of this good than the seller; the given exchange is 
therefore conditioned by trust  and its safeguarding entails 
relatively high transaction costs. The quality of these goods 
cannot be assessed by the consumer even after buying and 
consuming the good. See also “Economics of information”.  
Economics of 
information  
Information is important when deciding between alternatives, 
e.g. to buy an organic tomato or not. The European consumer 
usually is informed on the price and the origin of a tomato, but 
does not know all details of the production process or the 
quality characteristic of a specific tomato. To acquire 
information on a good’s characteristics as part of an exchange 
process (transaction) is costly.  
Economists categorise products according to the information 
costs on a good’s attributes. Search characteristics, e.g. the 
colour of a tomato, can be checked easily and at 
correspondingly low cost before buying. Experience 
characteristics like the taste of the tomato can only be 
checked after buying. Even after the purchase, credence 
characteristics can only be checked at considerable cost, e.g. 
the origin of a tomato or its organic quality (Darby and Karni ANNEX_Glossary 
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1973). Organic food products are credence goods.  
Institution  Specific social structures that govern human acts and enable 
coordination of collective activities. Institution is the key term 
for the so-called Institutional Economics, which refers to 
institutions as rules that structure economic and social life.  
The common perception of an institution is an organisation, 
but this is only one specific type of an institution (organisation 
is a more or less formalised entity). The term institution is hard 
to catch since many different things like the state, its 
constitution, a contract, matrimony and also the rules of a 
game are ranked among institutions  -  our world is full of 
institutions. The connection between different institutions is 
their governing character of social interaction, either of formal 
(e.g. a law or a contract) or informal kind (e.g. customs or 
unwritten rules of a group) (Göbel 2002).  
We understand an institution as a system of norms comprising 
instruments of enforcement targeting to particular goals. This 
system intends to govern individual behaviour (Richter and 
Furubotn 2003). Market institutions, e.g. an organic standard, 
support market functions and hereby directly affect the level of 
transaction costs (McMillan 2008).  
Managerial 
transaction costs 
Transactions in terms of an exchange process do not only 
occur externally on the market, but also internally between 
departments and colleagues within a firm.  
Managerial transaction costs are divided into  
Costs of setting up, maintaining and changing the 
organisational structure (mostly fixed costs), 
Costs of running the organisation (mostly variable 
costs) (Furubotn and Richter 2005).  
Managerial transaction costs are part of the overhead costs, 
whose share is considerable. Miller and Vollmann (1985) refer 
to the ‘hidden factory’, which exists inside the firm next to 
manufacturing (therefore hidden) to point out the high 
importance of these costs.   
Market 
transaction costs 
Market transactions are exchange processes and involve 
costs  –  transaction costs. The costs for using the market 
generally can be divided into four categories (Furubotn and 
Richter 2005):  
1)  Search and information costs,  
2)  Bargaining and decision costs,  
3)  Supervision and enforcement costs  ANNEX_Glossary 
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4)  Investments in social relations, such as building trust
16
These costs occur when organic food products are exchanged 
on the market: First, the trading partners have to find each 
other and exchange information on the good, e.g. its quality, 
and the trading partner, e.g. its credibility or its solvency (1). If 
they  want to trade on the available data, they have to 
negotiate the price and conditions of the exchange (2). After 
having concluded a contract, both partners will supervise, if 
the agreed conditions are kept and, if not, they  will try to 
enforce their rights or the law (3). Finally, the costs (including 
the opportunity costs of the time spent) of establishing long 
term trade relations are relevant, since a relation of reciprocal 
trust can lower transaction costs considerably (4).  
.  
Although, organic certification is implemented in order to 
facilitate the existence of the organic market by lowering 
transaction costs of the exchange of a credence good, the 
certification system itself induces considerable costs, too.  
Who bears transaction costs?  
Market transaction costs usually are borne by all parties 
involved in a transaction. The distribution of these costs 
between the trade partners depends on the specific 
transaction (specific distribution of quality uncertainty and 
transaction specific investments related to the transaction). 
Due to the design of organic inspection and certification 
system, a considerable part of the overall transaction cost is 
on the side of the seller first. The seller will try to factor the 
costs of inspection and certification in the gross price.  
Please confer to the tables in the Annex, where the different 
categories and forms of market transaction costs are 
illustrated in two examples of organic trade.  
New Institutional 
Economics  
One of the theoretical strains of the Institutional Economics. It 
evolved during the 1960s and draws on historical ’old’ school 
of Institutionalism. It acknowledges the importance of social 
institutions (such as property rights) for studying and 
explaining economic phenomena. 
A distinguishing feature of the New Institutional Economics is 
its insistence on the idea that market processes, i.e. 
transactions, are costly. This is regarded as an approach to 
real life compared to other economic models, since searching 
information as well as processing this data takes time and 
resources (unlike Neoclassical Economics, where fully 
informed subjects are assumed) (Göbel 2002; Furubotn and 
                                            
16 The term „investments in social relations“ can be seen as part of the broader concept of social capital as 
aggregate of interpersonal networks (Dasgupta 2008).  ANNEX_Glossary 
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Richter 2005). 
Opportunism  Model of mankind, which perceives that individuals are self-
interested and likely to be dishonest. Opportunistic behaviour 
can e.g. be “lying, stealing, cheating” in order to be better off 
(Williamson 1985). Opportunism can be active or passive, and 
can occur ex ante or ex post transaction.  
It is assumed that any participant of the market (in order to be 
realistic) must take into account eventual opportunism of other 
partners. There is always a certain risk of opportunism 
present.  
Opportunity 
costs 
The economic concept of opportunity cost aims at quantifying 
a foregone alternative in monetary units. Usually, these costs 
are used as a medium of comparison, when deciding between 
alternatives.  
For the CERTCOST project, the concept of opportunity costs 
is of special importance for the monetary evaluation of 
operators’ time spent on  inspection and certification 
requirements.  
Political 
transaction costs 
Political transaction costs occur when setting up, maintaining 
and also changing the political and administrative system.  
First, this includes the government’s costs for setting up the 
administrative structure and the judiciary. In the case of 
organic food, this is mainly the development and 
implementation  of regulation (EEC) no. 834/2007. In this 
political process, parties, pressure groups and stakeholders 
are involved and incur costs. Hence, political transaction costs 
are not only borne by the public system but also by the private 
sector, e.g. in the form of lobbying costs.  
Second, running the polity (politically organised society), i.e. 
public administrative duties generate costs. These are mainly 
costs of operating and monitoring the certification system but 
also the running costs of the legal system.  
Political transaction costs can be considerable. Whereas the 
running costs can be estimated, e.g. by means of the 
Standard cost model, the former, the set-up costs are more 
difficult to approach.  
Quality   The term quality, although often used, is a complex concept 
(Boekel 2005). Different disciplines have their specific 
understanding of what quality means. In economics, quality is 
defined as the sum of the attributes of a product, reflecting the 
different dimensions of quality, like in the case of food e.g. 
nutritional, sensory, ethical or organic quality. Different 
attributes are evaluated individually by different consumers, 
so, quality can either have an objective or a subjective aspect.  ANNEX_Glossary 
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Quality dimensions can be grouped as product quality, like 
food safety or food’s nutritional quality on the one hand, and 
as process quality, like organic quality on the other hand, 
resulting from the production process (Northen 2000). Product 
attributes usually can be tested on the product, whereas 
process attributes need to be monitored during the production 
process, since they cannot be tested on the product itself. See 
also “Economics of information”. Organic quality results from 
the production process. Thus, this specific quality cannot be 
tested on the product itself.  
Risk (economic)   Risk is one of the key determinants of many economic 
activities. Basically, risk can be defined as potential 
divergence from the expected result (Brandes et al. 1997). In 
the case of organic food products, consumers face the risk of 
buying a product labelled organic that does not fulfil the 
underlying standard, i.e. expected organic quality.  
In economics, risk is often distinguished from uncertainty: In 
situations with risk, information on the probability  of 
occurrences is available (derived from observed frequencies), 
whereas in situations involving uncertainty probabilities for 
different possible events do not exist.  
CERTCOST tries to identify risks,  i.e. objective probabilities 
based on existing data, which is connected to the 
characteristics of products or farmers in order to improve the 
targeting of organic inspections. This is known as risk based 
inspection.  
Standard Cost 
Model (SCM) 
“The Standard Cost Model is a method for determining the 
administrative burdens for businesses imposed by regulation” 
(International Standard Cost Model Network 2005). In 
CERTCOST, this model and its methodology will be applied to 
quantify the monetary costs of the certification system.  
Transaction   A transaction is the exchange of goods or services, for 
example buying an organic tomato. When buying the tomato, 
this good is transferred from the seller to the buyer for an 
agreed price. In other words, the tomato is exchanged against 
a defined amount of money. A transaction is a basic unit of 
analysis in the Institutional Economics Theory. 
Transaction 
costs 
The basic meaning of the term transaction is related to the 
exchange of a good or service between two parties. The idea 
that exchanging a good (service) is costly is pivotal for the 
concept of New Institutional Economics. The reasons for the 
existence of transaction costs are bounded rationality and 
opportunism sometimes along with asset specificity.  
Transaction costs can be categorised as follows:  
The cost of setting up, establishing, maintaining and ANNEX_Glossary 
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also changing this system - political transaction costs.  
the costs of exchanging goods on the market, in other 
words the costs of using the market -  market 
transaction costs;  
Goods or services can also be exchanged within firms. 
Then we talk of intrafirm or managerial transaction 
costs.  
Each category is illustrated in detail in this glossary.  
Transaction costs in the above mentioned three types can 
occur as variable as well as fixed costs (Furubotn and Richter 
2005). Variable transaction costs can depend on the number 
or  the volume  of transactions, while other transaction costs 
are fixed (i.e. independent from the number/volume of 
transactions), like e.g. enacting the organic regulation in terms 
of the specific investment for setting up institutional 
arrangements.  
Following Williamson, transactions can be characterized by 
three critical features (Williamson 1979):  
1)  Uncertainty  
2)  Transaction frequency  
3)  Transaction specific investments (asset specificity)  
These characteristics of transactions influence the amount of 
cost of a single transaction.  
Trust  Specific type of a social relation that entails a confidence that 
a partner (person, organisation etc.) will meet certain 
expectations. Trust enables communication with fewer 
frictions. Trust among partners can be seen as a social 
structure that prevents opportunistic behaviour. Hereby, trust 
can reduce transaction costs.  References  
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